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pacts before their establishment could help with the design of compensation schemes. Discrete choice experiments (DCEs) are increas-
ingly used for ex ante evaluations but their validity is largely untested in low-income settings. Using a case study of a new REDD+
(Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation) project in eastern Madagascar, we explore the validity of DCEs in
two ways: (i) whether the estimates of welfare costs derived from DCE are aﬀected by respondents’ prior experience of conservation
(ii) whether DCE results have high theoretical and content validity. We surveyed households who have varying degrees of experience
of restrictions to swidden agriculture. We also qualitatively debriefed a sub-sample of respondents to better understand their thought
processes. Latent class analysis shows that DCE outcomes vary with conservation experience. Households more experienced with forest
protection are less willing to trade-oﬀ rights to clear forest for swidden agriculture with any compensatory interventions whereas less
experienced households highly favor support for alternative agricultural techniques and a secure right to clear one hectare of forest.
Although the results show apparent non-attendance to some attributes (e.g., cash payments), qualitative debrieﬁngs suggest that respon-
dents infact do expect relatively low or no utility from the given attributes and hence have theoretically valid preferences. Similarly, the
DCE has generally high content validity. Although DCE can elicit current preferences in this context, using ex ante DCE to estimate the
welfare costs of such a long-term intervention requires caution. We conclude that it is diﬃcult to robustly estimate compensation in ad-
vance of an intervention, there is therefore a need to rethink conservation approaches, and the feasibility of achieving fair compensations
for conservation-imposed restrictions.
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Conserving biodiversity through the establishment of pro-
tected areas (PAs) has been the foundation of conservation
in the tropics. The number and extent of PAs have increased
rapidly in the last decades (Jenkins & Joppa, 2009), particu-
larly in least developed countries where they are viewed as
an urgent response to the increasing loss of biodiversity.
Although there is a wide range of PA categories, most involve
some degree of restrictions on access to natural resources
which may have negative impacts for the welfare of local com-
munities dependent on those resources. REDD+ (Reducing
Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation) is
resulting in a further increase in tropical forest areas where
access restrictions are imposed on local resource users
(Ghazoul, Butler, Mateo-Vega, & Koh, 2010).
Despite decades of recognition of these local costs, compen-
sation measures are often delayed, incomplete, or non-existent
(e.g., Cernea & Schmidt-Soltau, 2006). Attempts to provide
compensation started with integrated conservation and devel-
opment projects (ICDPs) in the 1980s, which promoted rural
development projects but which generally failed to achieve
development on a scale commensurate with the costs
(Brandon & Wells, 1992). Community-based natural resource
management (CBNRM) and related concepts have been pur-478sued to enable communities to participate in the management
of natural resources and beneﬁt from these resources (Brosius,
Tsing, & Zerner, 1998). Although there are successful cases,
CBNRM has often not been able to compensate for the2017.
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recently, Payments for Ecosystem Services (PES) schemes
emerged, with an aim to internalize the beneﬁts that people
obtain from ecosystems using market or quasi-market
exchanges (Grieg-Gran, Porras, & Wunder, 2005). However,
emerging evidence suggests that this is not providing a better
outcome for local people and that compliance is mostly
obtained by coercion (e.g., Milne, 2012). The REDD+ con-
cept, which can be seen as a carbon-focused PES scheme,
could be a means to ﬁnance the establishment of a new wave
of PAs (Harvey, Dickson, & Kormos, 2010). However, the
eﬀectiveness of REDD+ social safeguards in adequately com-
pensating local people has also been questioned (Chhatre &
Agrawal, 2009).
The perceived urgency of conservation may have resulted in
the dearth of ex ante assessment 1 and lack of consideration of
alternative policy options, and the inclusion of the views of the
aﬀected population. All of these may have contributed to com-
pensation failures. In this context, predicting the welfare
impacts of PAs before their establishment could provide valu-
able evidence to improve compensation. However, a major
constraint is ﬁnding robust methods to estimate welfare
impacts in advance. Discrete Choice Experiments (DCEs), a
stated preference valuation technique 2 (Freeman, 2003), can
oﬀer one approach to estimating welfare impacts ex ante
through the construction of hypothetical scenarios (e.g.,
Cranford & Mourato, 2014). While DCEs may be prone to
hypothetical bias (Hensher, 2010a), they may help decision
makers predict how respondents would adapt to a policy
change and devise compensation mechanisms that would inte-
grate the aﬀected population’s needs. Besides, by inferring pol-
icy impacts from the trade-oﬀs that respondents make, DCEs
avoid asking direct questions about the policy being valued
and therefore may be useful when valuing sensitive goods,
such as illegal activities (e.g., Moro et al., 2013; Nielsen,
Jacobsen, & Thorsen, 2014). We conducted a DCE survey
with rural households in eastern Madagascar aﬀected by forest
conservation to investigate the trade-oﬀs local people would
make between the right to clear new forests for swidden agri-
culture, cash payment compensation, and support for
improved rice farming.
Although DCE methods are increasingly used in environ-
mental valuation, their validity, especially in low-income rural
settings, is largely untested (Rakotonarivo, Schaafsma, &
Hockley, 2016; Whittington, 2010). First, this paper uses a
natural experiment to assess the validity of ex ante DCE, con-
ceptualized as the degree to which the method is measuring
what the researcher intends it to measure (Bateman et al.,
2002). If researchers’ aim is to measure the welfare impacts
of forest conservation to inform the design of compensation
policies, validity therefore concerns how well the DCE
method, as an ex ante impact assessment tool, can achieve
this. 3 How well ex ante assessment can predict the impacts
of conservation may depend on the eﬀect of respondents’ prior
experience with the policy. If DCE outcomes are aﬀected by
experience of forest conservation, this suggests that DCE con-
ducted only with respondents who are yet to experience con-
servation may not be suitable for predicting welfare impacts
and required compensations. 4 Complex and long-lasting
interventions such as forest conservation may have long-
lasting eﬀects on household wellbeing which are hard for a
respondent to estimate in advance.
Second, this paper aims to examine the theoretical and con-
tent validity of our DCE results by assessing how well they
conform to the assumptions of the method. The ﬁrst assump-
tion relates to the continuity axiom of rational choice theorywhich postulates that DCE respondents need to attend to all
attribute levels across each of the alternatives and make ‘‘com-
pensatory” trade-oﬀs (Campbell, Hensher, & Scarpa, 2011;
Campbell, Hutchinson, & Scarpa, 2008). However, it may be
diﬃcult to distinguish genuine attribute non-attendance (that
is ignorance of an attribute because of an incomprehensible
survey design or other concerns not captured or raised by
the DCE survey) from no (or low) preference for given attri-
butes (i.e., low attribute importance) (Hess, Stathopoulos,
Campbell, O’Neill, & Caussade, 2013). The former is a viola-
tion of the continuity axiom, the latter is not. What is observed
in DCE results, e.g., apparent patterns of non-attendance to
some attributes, may not always reveal respondents’ thought
processes, and qualitative debrieﬁngs that directly examine
decision processes, i.e., how people make decisions, can help
disentangle such issues (Arana & Leon, 2009; Powe, Garrod,
& McMahon, 2005). Here, we test the extent to which our
results conform to the continuity axiom by exploring the pro-
cesses through which respondents arrive at their choice deci-
sions using qualitative debrieﬁng interviews with a sub-
sample of respondents.
Another assumption of the DCE method pertains to the
content validity of DCE, i.e., whether the survey descriptions
and questions are ‘‘clear, plausible, and unbiased” so that
respondents are motivated to reveal their true preferences
(Bateman et al., 2002). If respondents protest some features
of the survey scenario, they may not have the incentives to
accurately state their true welfare costs (e.g., Meyerhoﬀ &
Liebe, 2009). If respondents for instance distrust or misper-
ceive the payment vehicle i.e., the means through which the
policy outcome is delivered (Morrison, Blamey, & Bennett,
2000), or they do not believe that their responses could poten-
tially inﬂuence policy (Vossler & Watson, 2013), their choice
decisions may not be valid indications of their preferences.
In our qualitative debrieﬁng interviews we examined the extent
to which a perceived lack of plausibility of the payment vehicle
or consequentiality of the DCE survey may bias the results.
This is the only DCE study we know of that investigates the
validity of DCE results in a low-income setting by explicitly
looking at the eﬀect on people’s choices of varying exposure
to a complex and long-term intervention (in this case restric-
tions on land use). We also believe it is the only study in a
low-income context to enrich a DCE survey with rigorous
qualitative data collection approaches which can signiﬁcantly
help to understand the psychological processes leading to
respondents’ answers. These additions to established economic
valuation techniques for use in a low-income setting have
broad applicability for environment and development
researchers. However the paper also has signiﬁcant implica-
tions for conservation policies and the design of compensation
measures around protected areas including PES and REDD+
projects.2. METHODS
(a) Case study and sampling procedure
Madagascar’s protected area network has been recently
expanded from 3.1% of Madagascar terrestrial surface area
(1.8 million hectares) in 2003 to 10% in 2012 and now covers
most of the remaining natural habitat. The local swidden agri-
cultural system known as tavy (De Wilde, Buisson,
Ratovoson, Randrianaivo, Carrie`re, & Ii, 2012) has been
regarded as the main driver of deforestation in eastern Mada-
gascar. At low population densities tavy may be sustainable,
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conservation objectives (Scales, 2014). Clearance of primary
forest in the tavy system is known speciﬁcally as teviala and
is the main focus of conservation goals and policies.
Teviala has been criminalized in Madagascar since colonial
times, however enforcement has often been weak (Kull,
2004). With the support of international donors, the state is
currently making a renewed attempt to outlaw teviala and
coercively enforce the ban. De facto, many forestlands are
not subject to well-deﬁned formal property right regimes,
though local systems of customary tenure frequently mix with,
and evolve in response to, formal state laws (Muttenzer, 2010).
To investigate the eﬀect of experience of forest conservation
on local preferences, we purposefully selected two sites
Ampahitra (APT) and Mantadia (MTD) in the eastern rain-
forests of Madagascar which diﬀered in their exposure to for-
est protection but were otherwise similar in terms of forest
characteristics (i.e., situated in the same ecological zone with
similar topographic and altitudinal characteristics), market
access and infrastructure. The ﬁrst site, the fokontany 5 of
APT, is part of a new protected area set up in Madagascar fol-
lowing the country’s commitment to triple its protected areas
and where people have only been exposed to conservation
restrictions for a relatively short period (5 years). APT is part
of the corridor Ankeniheny–Zahamena (‘‘CAZ”) protected
area and co-managed by Conservation International and com-
munity associations. The other site, MTD with two fokontany
(Volove and Vohibazaha) has a long history of strict conserva-
tion and is part of the Andasibe-Mantadia protected area
established 20 years ago and managed by Madagascar
National Parks. The dominant and indigenous ethnicity in
these two study sites (Figure 1) are Betsimisaraka.
There is poor information available on the location and size
of communities in much of rural Madagascar making it diﬃ-
cult to develop a rigorous sampling frame. Since no map or
census of households was available, we constructed the sam-
pling frame in three steps: (i) key-informant interviews with
fokontany authorities to develop a sketch-map of villages, (ii)
key-informant interviews in villages to collect information
on households and hamlets, (iii) visits to hamlets in person
to cross check information and record GPS locations ensuring
that no isolated household was missed out. Building the sam-Figure 1. Study sites: Ampahitra (CAZ New Propling frame took approximately 50 person-days in each site
and approximately 1/3 of the total ﬁeld work time. In each site
we identiﬁed villages that were close to the forest and therefore
aﬀected by conservation.
We identiﬁed in total 417 households residing across the
eight villages within the fokontany of APT and 241 households
across the ﬁve villages within the fokontany of Volove and
Vohibazaha in MTD. With the aim of interviewing a mini-
mum of 100 households at least in each site, we randomly sam-
pled at 65% allowing for replacement from each village
(proportional random sampling). We surveyed 203 6 house-
holds in total in APT and 104 in MTD, with roughly 50%
of the households surveyed from each sample.
(b) Choice experiment design
The attributes and levels (Table 1) were informed by three
focus group discussions and pilot testing of the design with
50 respondents in nearby fokontany (See Appendix A for an
excerpt of the background scenario, and Appendix C for the
DCE experimental design).
(c) Data collection
The DCE survey was piloted in three phases between Febru-
ary and June 2014 in villages near the sampled villages. The
actual survey was carried out from July to October 2014.
The questionnaire was administered by OSR, RM, and three
enumerators who all held at least a bachelor’s degree in agri-
cultural sciences from the University of Antananarivo. Enu-
merators received two weeks of training from OSR on the
theoretical underpinnings of the DCE method, ethical consid-
erations, and how to conduct the survey. Field activities were
also closely supervised by NH who speaks ﬂuent Malagasy
and has more than ﬁve years’ experience of similar ﬁeld work.
Our unit of analysis is the household and interviews were con-
ducted with the household head, his spouse, and other house-
hold members.
The questionnaire comprised three sections: (1) Socio-
economic characteristics of the household including educa-
tion, household characteristics, land holdings, other house-
hold assets, and wealth indicators (such as food security), (2)tected Area) and Mantadia (National Park).
Table 1. Attributes and levels of the DCE (reference levels in bold)
Attributes Description Levels Coding and
Notation
Hypotheses (Expected sign
of coeﬃcients with WTA
estimates in brackets)
Total cash donations
framed as
development
assistance (3,080
MGA = 1 USD)
The cash donations were framed as development
assistance that the household would receive.
Review of secondary data and previous
literature estimating the local costs of
deforestation aided the selection of the payment
levels (e.g., Ferraro, 2002; Shyamsundar &
Kramer, 1996). These were then further in-
formed by focus groups and pilot testing.
0, 3, 6, 9, 12, 15
(106 MGA)
Cash (continuous
variable)
More cash increases the
average respondents’ utility
(+)
Number of annual
installments over
which the household
will receive the total
payments
The three levels of installments allow an
estimation of the respondents’ discount rates
and provide information on the respondents’
ability to invest money
1, 10, 20 Dummy-coded:
Installment10 and
installment20
Higher number of
installments is expected to
decrease the average
respondents’ utility () (due
to discounting)
Support for
improved rice
farming
This attribute is introduced as a sustainable and
modern agricultural package that includes
productivity enhancing practices such as the use
of fertilizers, insecticides and/or herbicides. It
involves digging and possibly the construction of
terraces for slopes and precludes the use of ﬁre
as a way to maintain fertility while not fallowing
the land. It also includes material support (e.g.,
improved seeds, wheelbarrow, spades, etc.).
No, yes Dummy-coded:
Support for
improved rice
farming coded as 1
Improved agricultural
practice may increase the
average respondents’ utility
(+)
Teviala (clearance of
new forestlands for
agriculture)
This attribute has three levels: i) no teviala (i.e.,
strict enforcement of restrictions), ii) a permit
for one hectare of teviala (a one-oﬀ
opportunity), iii) free teviala (similar to pre-
colonial times before criminalization of teviala,
and de facto to more recent periods of little or no
enforcement).
Free teviala
(open forest
frontier), 1 ha
of teviala permit
and no teviala
(strict
protection),
Dummy-coded:
teviala 1 ha, no
teviala
Restrictions on teviala are
expected to decrease the
average respondents’ utility
(-)
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aspects of the valuation exercise, four were measured on a
ﬁve-point Likert scale while the last one is a binary question
(i) Plausibility of the survey scenario, particularly the payment
vehicle, (ii) Trust in the institution that is to deliver the cash
donations, (iii) Consequentiality of the valuation exercise
(i.e., how much respondents believe the results would be used
to inform policy), (iv) Perceptions of the support for improved
rice farming, and (v) Perceptions of the beneﬁts of forest pro-
tection. OSR also conducted debrieﬁng interviews the follow-
ing day with a sub-sample selected to represent the full range
of DCE responses (N = 25 from 206 respondents) to examine
their decision-making processes. The number of interviewees
was determined by data saturation.
We explained the DCE survey to respondents using dolls
and large pictures (Appendix B) which helped respondents
engage with the survey and framed it as a game to desensitize
the illegal nature of teviala (an approach used by Nielsen et al.
(2014) when valuing illegal bushmeat hunting in Tanzania).
The full survey took one to two hours per household with
some warm-up steps to give respondents some practice and
ensure they understood the task of making trade-oﬀs in a
DCE survey. Our study protocol was reviewed and approved
by the Bangor University’s Ethics Review Committee.
(d) Data analysis
(i) Analysis of DCE results
Since respondents may have heterogeneous preferences, we
estimated a latent class model (LCM) using the pooled dataset
to identify the sources of heterogeneity and segments ofrespondents with similar preferences (see Appendix D)
(Boxall and Adamowicz, 2002). Choosing the number of
classes for the LCM involves a trade-oﬀ between model sim-
plicity and explanatory power, and should be informed by
the signiﬁcance of parameter estimates, analyst judgment
regarding the interpretability of the model results, the Akaike
and the Bayesian Information Criteria (AIC and BIC respec-
tively) (Scarpa & Thiene, 2005). Based on these criteria (see
Appendix G 7), we selected a 4-class model.
The utility function of an individual n facing a choice
between two experimentally created alternatives and a refer-
ence level alternative can be described as:
V ðASC;Xni; bkÞ þ eni if i ¼ reference level alternative; otherwise;
V ðXni;bkÞ þ eni

ð1Þ
where Uni is the utility function for individual n, for alternative
i. V is the observed indirect utility, which is a function of Xni, a
vector of observable attributes and associated ﬁxed parame-
ters bk. We specify an alternative speciﬁc constant (ASC) for
the reference level, and a Gumbel distributed error term eni
as a means of capturing the unobservable factors beyond attri-
butes present in the choice sets. We specify the utility function
(Uni) of an individual n of the alternative i as:
Uni ¼ b1 cashþ b2 installment 10þ b3 installment 20
þ b4 support for improved rice farming
þ b5 teviala 1 haþ b6 Notevialaþ eni ð2Þ
Table 2. Covariates explaining LCM segment membership
Variables Description Summary statistics
APT MTD
(N = 102) (N = 104)
Household-level
experience
Variable indicating how long the household has been exposed
to conservation restrictions.
Range 1–5 2–20
Mean 4.3 19.32
Std. dev 1.2 3.17
Young households Binary variable indicating 5 or less years of household
formation (highly correlated with the age of the household
head) [1 = YES; 0 = NO]
YES 32 (31%) 40 (38%)
Literacy Binary variable indicating whether the household head is
literate. [0 = NO; 1 = YES]
YES 56 (55%) 82 (78%)
Tavy seeds Numeric variable measuring the quantity of rice seed required
to farm the households’ swidden agriculture (tavy) plots,
measured in kapoaka (a local unit of measurement, roughly
equivalent to a cup). This variable is used as a proxy for the
area of swidden agricultural plots.
Range 0–1900 0–1600
Mean 208 225
Std. dev 175 184
Median 201 180
Livestock owned Numeric variable indicating the total livestock ownership of a
household measured in ‘Tropical Livestock Units’ (Chilonda &
Otte, 2006). This variable is used as an indicator of household
wealth.
Range 0–8.23 0–6.25
Mean 0.86 0.63
Std. dev 1.9 0.86
Median 0.10 0.17
Beneﬁciary of World
Bank project
Recent World Bank development projects in 2013 aimed at
compensating households potentially aﬀected by forest
protection and encouraging pro-conservation attitudes. Each
beneﬁciary was provided with either beekeeping, poultry or
agricultural support. This variable is used as an indicator of
experiences of development interventions [1 = YES; 0 = NO]
YES 17 (17%) 18 (17%)
Experiences of the
improved rice
farming
Binary variable indicating whether household has any
experiences of the improved rice farming [1 = YES; 0 = NO]
(1 = household has implemented it or seen others doing it,
0 = household has only heard about it or has neither heard
nor seen it)
YES 22 (22%) 39 (37%)
482 WORLD DEVELOPMENTThe latent class model is estimated as four conditional logit
models, in which the class membership probability is estimated
simultaneously. The class membership probability can further
be explained by possible sources of heterogeneity across seg-
ments. We included the household-level experience variable
to explain segment membership as well as six relevant socio-
demographic variables (Table 2).
The household-level experience variable measures how long
the household has been exposed to conservation restrictions,
and is calculated from two parameters:
The number of years the site has been de facto exposed to for-
est protection. For respondents in MTD this is 20 years as the
Park was formally established in 1994. APT ﬁrst received pro-
visional protection status in 2007 but this was formalized only
in October 2013 (Ruta, 2014). Penalization of two residents for
teviala in 2009 was reported by respondents so we classiﬁed
respondents in APT as having experienced 5 years of forest
protection from 2009 to 2014 (but the results are not sensitive
to varying this from 4 to 7 years).
The immigration status of the individual household, i.e., how
long the household has resided in the area. The composite
household-level experience variable takes the smaller value
of any of these two variables, e.g., if the household resides
in APT but has been living in the area for only 3 years, its
household-level experience is 3 years whereas it equals 5 if
the household has been in the area for 8 years.
Attitudinal variables in the class membership probability
function may create endogeneity problems (Hess & Beharry-
Borg, 2012). Attitudinal data are actually functions of latent
attitudes, i.e., they are not exogenous to the choice variables
and are not a genuine expression of fundamental attitudes
(Provencher & Moore, 2006). We therefore estimated the ex-post individual segment membership probabilities and used
this to calculate probability weighted values for these variables
(Hess, Ben-Akiva, Gopinath, & Walker, 2011) using Eqn. (3):
X segment1 ¼
PN
n¼1p:XnPN
n¼1pn1
ð3Þ
where N is the number of respondents, X is the value of the
attitudinal variable, and pn1 is the estimated probability of
respondent n falling into segment 1, computed from the seg-
ment allocation model. Data were analyzed with Nlogit 5.0
and Stata 12.
(ii) Qualitative debrieﬁng
Interviews, which lasted from 30 minutes to one hour, were
audio recorded after obtaining consent and professionally
transcribed for theoretical thematic analysis (Braun &
Clarke, 2006). We assigned codes to data segments using
Nvivo 10, which were then grouped into larger themes. Codes
and themes were constantly revised based on new insights
from data analysis. Another co-author cross-checked the
codes, the quality of the transcriptions, and checked the verac-
ity of the translation of the extracts.3. RESULTS
(a) Sample characteristics
Households across the two sites were similar in most socio-
economic characteristics (Appendix E). In both sites mean
household size is six and household heads averaged less than
QUALITATIVE AND QUANTITATIVE EVIDENCE ON THE TRUE LOCAL WELFARE 483three years of schooling. Food security is low with households
having suﬃcient food for only half of the year on average.
However there were diﬀerences in variables which may be
aﬀected by conservation restrictions: only 5% of household
heads in MTD were migrants compared to 75% in APT, of
which half had arrived in the last 10 years. 96% of households
accessed at least one of their plots by inheritance in MTD ver-
sus 30% in APT, while only 17% accessed their lands by forest
clearance in MTD versus 42% in APT. This conﬁrms the
weaker enforcement of forest protection and consequently
high immigration and recent land clearance in APT. 8 The Bet-
simisaraka ethnic group forms 98% of the total sample in
MTD and 80% in APT. Table 2 presents the summary statis-
tics of the seven socio-economic variables included in the
LCM as well as the household-level experience composite vari-
able.
(b) Latent segments and their characteristics
The alternative speciﬁc constant (ASC) takes the value of 1
for the alternative describing the reference level (set as no cash,
no support for rice farming and free teviala), in all four seg-
ments, the ASC is not signiﬁcant (Table 3), indicating that
the full value of the proposed alternatives are captured by
the attributes.
The household-level experience of forest conservation and
other socio-economic variables are signiﬁcantly associated
with preference heterogeneity (Table 3). Segment 1 households
(‘‘holdouts”, 33% of households) prefer the free teviala sce-Table 3. Latent segments and their determinants. The model is estimated on the
utility of changes in each attribute level on the average respondent relative to th
teviala. For the installment attribu
SEGMENT 1:
‘‘Holdouts”
SEG
‘‘Im
Coeﬃcient Std. error Co
Total cash donations 0.112 0.180 0
Installment = 10 years 1.332 1.257 0
Installment = 20 years 1.987** 0.892 1
Support for improved rice farming 0.299 0.608 4.
Teviala 1 ha 3.264*** 0.85 4.
No teviala 6.229** 2.748 1
Alternative speciﬁc constant (ASC) 0.929 0.812 
Segment size (%) 33.3
Explanatory variables o
Coeﬃcient Std. error Co
Constant 1.532* 0.798 1
Householdlevel experience .093*** 0.038 0
Young household (1 = yes, 0 = no) 1.004 0.736 0
Literacy (1 = literate, 0 = illiterate) 0.082 0.699 
Land holdings (tavy plots proxied by seeds) 0.003 0.001 0
Livestock owned (tropical livestock unit) 0.041 0.015 0
Experiences of the technical rice farming
(1 = yes, 0 = no)
0.556 0.570 
Beneﬁciary of World Bank projects
(1 = yes, 0 = no)
0.269* 0.776 1.
Log-likelihood
McFadden’s pseudo R2
Akaike information Criterion (AIC)
Akaike information Criterion (AIC)/n
Bayesian information Criterion (BIC)
Obs.
Note: ***, **, * ? Signiﬁcance at 1%, 5%, 10% level.nario regardless of compensation and are composed mostly
of more experienced households who are more likely to have
been left out of the World Bank funded development projects.
Conversely, households in segment 2 (‘‘improved farming”,
30%) are likely to be relatively less experienced in forest use
restrictions and preferred secure rights over one hectare of
teviala to an open forest frontier. They also positively and
highly value the technical and material support for improved
rice farming. These households are likely to have beneﬁted
from the development project. Respondents in segment 3
(‘‘trade-oﬀs”, 15%) are likely to be composed of households
with and without experience of conservation restrictions who
traded oﬀ the cash donations with use restrictions, i.e., they
positively value the cash payments and get disutility from
teviala restrictions. This segment is likely to be composed of
newly formed households with young household heads.
Finally, members of segment 4 (‘‘cash”, 21%) value only the
cash payments (highly signiﬁcant and positive), and likely
comprise experienced and inexperienced households. These
cash preferring respondents express a non-monotonic prefer-
ence for the installment attributes, favoring the medium time-
frame (10 years) to one lump sum payment and strongly
disfavoring longer timeframes (20 years). Literacy rate,
respondents’ experiences of support for rice farming, tavy
seeds and livestock owned do not signiﬁcantly explain segment
membership.
The follow-up data show that the majority of respondents in
the four segments reported neutral views toward the indepen-
dent institution which is to manage the cash donations overpooled dataset. For each latent segment, the coeﬃcients show the eﬀects on
e reference level of no cash, no support for improved rice farming, and free
tes, the base level is one year
MENT 2
proved farming”
SEGMENT 3 ‘‘trade-
oﬀs”
SEGMENT 4 ‘‘cash”
eﬃcient Std. error Coeﬃcient Std. error Coeﬃcient Std. error
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f class probability
eﬃcient Std. error Coeﬃcient Std. error Coeﬃcient Std. error
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.230 0.791 2.256** 0.899 Fixed
0.242 0.656 1.040 0.985 Fixed
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0.673 0.649 0.293 0.7918 Fixed
59058* 0.917 0.515 1.319 Fixed
847.067
0.3767
1798.134
1.450
2064.35
1,236 (N = 206)
a. Trust in payment vehicle “I trust that the independent instuon will transparently and eﬀecvely manage the cash donaon over me” 
b. Plausibility of the cash 
payments 
“A donor genuinely interested in development would donate cash instead of usual 
development projects (e.g. improved rice farming)”
c. Consequenality of the DCE 
survey 
“I believe that the results of this research would be used to inform policy on forest 
conservaon” 
d. Percepons of the support 
for rice farming  “I believe that support for improved rice farming would beer my livelihoods” 
e. Percepon of the beneﬁts of 
forest protecon “Forest protecon provides beneﬁts which are important to my livelihoods” 
*Statements a. b, c, d are based on a ﬁve-point Likert scale: 1=‘strongly disagree’, 2=‘disagree’, 3= ‘neither disagree nor 
agree’, 4=‘agree’, 5=‘strongly agree’, Statement e is based on a binary queson (1=Yes, 0=No) 
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Figure 2. Probability weighted attitudinal variables calculated from the class membership probabilities of the latent segment model.
484 WORLD DEVELOPMENTtime (Figure 2). They all tended to believe the cash payments
to be plausible, with no large disparity between the four seg-
ments. Segment 1 ‘‘holdouts” scored the lowest for the belief
in the consequentiality of the valuation exercise, as well as
for the perceptions of the technical rice farming and the eco-
logical beneﬁts of forest protection whereas segment 2 ‘‘im-
proved farming” believed in the consequentiality, were very
optimistic toward the support for rice farming and positively
valued forest protection. These patterns generally support
the choice patterns of these segments.
(c) Respondents’ rationale for their choice decisions
For each of our qualitative debrieﬁng interviews, we
assigned each interviewee (n = 25) to one segment based on
the highest ex-post individual class membership probability
from the LCM) (Appendix F). Below we highlight similarities
and diﬀerences within each segment. We also describe any out-
liers in the ‘‘holdout” and ‘‘improved farming” segments (i.e.,
respondents with similar patterns of DCE responses but who
diﬀered from the rest of the segment on the household-level
experience of conservation).
(d) Segment 1 ‘‘Holdouts” (33% of the sample)
This segment is mostly composed of more experienced
households, i.e., households who have been exposed to restric-
tions for a relatively long period. They (n = 7, I1–I7—Appen-
dix F) are not willing to trade-oﬀ teviala with either cash or
support for rice farming.
Holdouts express rational utility maximizing arguments in
favor of teviala: many claimed (I1, I2, I4, I5) that the crops
they will be able to harvest from an open forest frontier sce-
nario and the utility they would thereby expect far outweigh
the cash payments oﬀered. They believe that teviala is sustain-able and can continue across many generations, they are con-
ﬁdent that they will be able to produce the highest and most
reliable yields from forest lands given the expertise they have
acquired over centuries of trial and error. They do not value
cash payments due to their limited opportunity to invest them
(such as remoteness and lack of market access).
Some (I5 to I7) also emphasized the important cultural val-
ues of teviala practices, how they make a living is deeply
rooted in their cultural norms and they ﬁnd it hard to imagine
alternative ways of life. They also talked of the importance of
compliance with tavy rituals and submission to traditional
authorities (tangalamena) with regard to access to new lands.
Holdouts also anchored their choices on concerns for their
future descendants’ needs. Land from teviala is seen as the
most valuable inheritance they can leave their children and
they considered accepting cash as a self-centered behavior,
betraying their future descendants’ rights and needs:
‘‘So supposedly, we will receive cash for 10, 20 years, and that’s it?
Then what are we supposed to do since we cannot do teviala anymore,
what would happen to my children and my grandchildren? Let it be
very clear, if cash payments will ﬂow every year, forever, just as people
who worked for the government (fonctionaire) are still receiving retire-
ment pension, then we would be in, otherwise, no.”
[I6 (indigene, 58, MTD)]
This segment also expressed concern that only the elites and
the socially well-connected households would beneﬁt from
external help, leading to suﬀering by the most vulnerable
groups often most aﬀected by restrictions on land uses. Inter-
estingly, this group does not recognize any ecological beneﬁts
from the forests. These perceptions were not altered by further
probing about examples of regulating services such as climate
regulation, erosion control, and cleaner air.
Many interviewees in this segment (I3 to I7) were distrustful
of the proposed novel agricultural technique which they
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exempliﬁed by the statement: ‘‘rice cannot be grown without
ﬁre, you simply can’t.” (I7, indigene, 37, MTD). They have
been disappointed by the training provided and the lack of fol-
low up provided by similar interventions in the past and
claimed that these new techniques require substantial start-
up funds and support that external agents failed to deliver.
This contradicts the LCM results which suggest that the expe-
rience of support for improved rice cultivation does not signif-
icantly explain the grouping identiﬁed. 9
Two outliers (I1 and I2) exhibited the same choice patterns
as segment 1 but are young households in APT, recent
migrants and hence lacking long experience of use restrictions.
They share the concerns of the rest of the segment over land
scarcity but for these outliers, choices are principally driven
by land scarcity caused by the rapid immigration and high
level of conﬂict over access to land rather than experience of
forest use restrictions. As I2 (migrant, 22, APT) said:
``I came too late, there are no unowned forests left nearby, we have to bor-
row fallow lands which are not very fertile. As I recently got married, I ha-
ven't got my share, I have to acquire my own lands to feed my family, but I
do not dare clear forests as they all have owners.”(i) Segment 2 ‘‘improved farming” (30%)
These households have been exposed to forest use restric-
tions for a relatively short period. They (n = 10, I8–I17) pos-
itively prefer a one-oﬀ, one hectare, legal forest clearance
permit to strict protection and unanimously associate this with
secure individual land tenure, which they value highly. Since
competition for new forestlands is becoming increasingly ﬁerce
where forest protection is weakly enforced, the longer estab-
lished households or indigenes among this group believe that
legal forest tenure would better enable them to establish claims
over forestlands. They fear losing their forest and fallow lands
to the ongoing inﬂux of migrant smallholders. They despise
the military enforcement of strict forest protection and argue
that they are in a much better position to protect their forests
than any state representatives as long as they have legal
tenure.
Many of this segment claim that they do not intend to clear
the one hectare of forestlands but preserve it for their descen-
dants who can clear it if they do not have better options.
``The way we perceive things now, our children may perceive it differently,
they may no longer want to protect these forests. I think this will depend on
their education and whatever alternative livelihoods they ﬁnd. For instance,
if they get some education, they may ﬁnd other options, who knows, they
may decide to move to town. Otherwise, they may just clear these forests.
Only fate will decide. . .”
[I12 (indigene, 20, APT)]
These households also highly favor the support for
improved rice farming, although their experiences of such agri-
cultural interventions are generally low. These respondents,
especially migrants, often associate the proposed improved
rice farming with paddy ﬁelds and digging, a practice they
are familiar with. Indigenes are also willing to try the
approach but feel the topography with few exploitable valleys
constrains the likely success. Nonetheless, they perceive the
technical and material support for agricultural intensiﬁcation
as more dependable than cash.
This group also slightly preferred the strict forest protection
attribute to an open forest frontier (although this is not statis-
tically signiﬁcant). Perceived societal beneﬁts of forest conser-
vation (positive externalities including ecological services)
contribute to these preferences, as well as the fear of losing
land to the ongoing inﬂux of migrants.Like the ‘holdout’ group, this group tends not to value cash
payments highly due to their perception of the limited oppor-
tunities to invest cash (n = 10). Some (I9, I16, and I17) men-
tioned they would prefer communal investment (such as
improved market access through road construction or health
centers). One respondent (I9) associated the cash donations
with credit which he perceived as extremely damaging and
prone to hidden agendas, noting that nothing is ever free.
Just as for the holdouts, two outliers diﬀer from others
assigned to this latent class (I16 and I17) as they have experi-
enced at least 20 years of strict forest protection. Their main
rationales do not signiﬁcantly diverge from the majority in this
‘‘improved farming” segment as they view forest protection as
something that their future descendants and the world should
beneﬁt from. The one hectare of teviala permit is perceived as
a shrinkage of the national park, and recognition of people’s
needs, i.e., they aspire to a secure right to clear that they would
not necessarily exercise.
(ii) Segment 3 ‘‘Trade-oﬀ” (15%)
Segment 3 ‘‘trade-oﬀ” is composed of both experienced and
inexperienced households. These households (n = 3, I18–I20)
seem to have traded oﬀ the cash donations with use restric-
tions, i.e., they are willing to accept cash compensations to oﬀ-
set the foregone beneﬁts of future forest use restrictions.
The less experienced household head interviewed in this
group (I18) shows explicit economic reasoning, trading-oﬀ
the amount of cash with the revenue he would get from forest
clearing. He also clearly diﬀered from the previous two seg-
ments in the value he gave to cash payments and can envisage
investing cash to generate returns. A recent immigrant from
the Merina ethnic group (from the generally more developed
region around the capital), ascribed his ability to invest money
to his previous experience of urban life and his alternative
sources of income (his wife is a government teacher). This
household head does not intend to do teviala at present but
would be attracted by the opportunities to clear forests should
the forest frontier be open.
``If forest frontier is open, anyone, whether the wealthy or the poor, those
who have got lots of lands and those who are deprived will go there and
farm in the forest, to be honest, even me, we must do teviala if restriction
is lifted, since there is no longer any obstacle.”
[I18 (recent migrant, 42, MTD)]
The more experienced respondents in this segment (I19 and
I20) on the other hand recognized the value of cash compen-
sation and insisted that such compensation was a right. Just
as the state and the society have the right to beneﬁt from forest
protection, they believe that they should be also entitled to suf-
ﬁcient compensations.
Since they don't even allows us to farm on the fallow lands that our ances-
tors left for us, they must compensate us. Otherwise, we will forcefully en-
ter the park, we will ﬁght for our rights, it is a sacriﬁce that I am ready to
make for the next generation. We are actually entitled to get 50% of the
park tourism revenue, but that's obviously not enough! This money was
not even enough for the school construction. 50% of the park tourism rev-
enue is not enough for four Fokontany. Receiving money as compensation
for forest protection is ﬁne but small amounts of money don't make sense.”
[I19 (indigene, 39, MTD)]
Respondents assigned to this class are likely to be younger
households (Table 3). Despite their willingness to trade-oﬀ
rights to teviala with cash, some of them raised concerns about
ongoing need for land.
``I am willing to accept cash donations since I won't be able to do teviala
anymore, but money alone is not enough because it is very difﬁcult to use it
here, particularly if you don't have lands that you can cultivate. So ideally,
486 WORLD DEVELOPMENTwe should get both new lands and money so that we can invest the money
in our cultivation.”
[I20 (indigene, 24, MTD)]
Households in this segment generally express neutral prefer-
ences for the improved rice farming. They prefer cash that they
can use as they wish over externally deﬁned development pro-
jects.
(iii) Segment 4 ‘‘Cash” (21%)
Respondents belonging to this class get a highly positive
utility from the cash payments and seem indiﬀerent to any
forms of forest use restrictions and improved rice farming.
They comprise both experienced and inexperienced house-
holds (n = 5, I21–I25).
Some households (I21 and I23) are not interested in teviala
at all—they associate teviala practices with an undesirable
nomadic lifestyle. Others (I22, I24, and I25) emphasize that
if they had alternative livelihoods, they would happily aban-
don teviala. Some have already started seeking alternative
agricultural techniques to adapt to forest use restrictions
e.g., by converting small valleys to paddy ﬁelds. They believe
that paddy ﬁelds will last and be transferable to future descen-
dants whereas clearable forests will not be available forever.
Households in this segment are eager to intensify agriculture
on paddy ﬁelds. They often see paddy ﬁelds and improved
(rain fed) rice farming as two conﬂicting practices that cannot
go hand in hand given their limited resources and capital.
They are relatively uncertain about the prospective yields from
the improved rice farming and will only adopt if demonstra-
tion projects are successful:
``They need to implement pilot projects ﬁrst, if they are successful, people
will be automatically in, long speeches are useless, people just want to see
for themselves.”
[I25 (indigene, 64, MTD)]
This segment highly values cash which they currently feel
constrained by: ‘‘Like a foreigner trapped in one island, our
hearts are longing for so many things but we cannot ﬁnd
dry land to move over” (I25). Cash compensation would
enable them to aﬀord to send their children to the nearest
town, to pay their school fees and living costs. One young
household head, I23, (21 years old, recent migrant, MDT)
expressed his intention to migrate to urban areas and open a
small shop.
The utility that these households expect to get from the
installment attribute is non-monotonic i.e., when compared
to a lump sum payment, they strongly prefer a 10-year time
horizon but highly disfavor the long time horizon (20 years),
other things equal. They ascribe the preference for the 10-
year timeframe to their inability to invest money and the
volatility of cash. The 20-year timeframe is however perceived
as less trustworthy.
Responses suggest that this group did not consider any soci-
etal values in their choice decisions but were instead mostly
concerned about their households’ well-being:
``If I disclose my choice to others, they won't be happy with me, but I do
not care and anyway, you assured me that my answers will be kept secret, as
the saying goes: Roosters ﬁghting in the tomb, both strive to stay alive.”
[I23 (recent migrant, 21, MDT)](e) Are the theoretical assumptions of the DCE method met?
The qualitative debrieﬁngs suggest mixed evidence on the
continuity axiom which requires that respondents should
attend to all attribute levels across each of the alternatives
and trade them oﬀ while evaluating their preferred choices.In many cases, we ﬁnd a no (or low)-value of the attribute
rather than a non-attendance (or total ignorance), albeit viola-
tion of the continuity axiom did happen in a few cases.
There are for instance some cases (e.g., I1, I2, I4, I5 in seg-
ment ‘‘holdouts”) where, although the choices made suggest
respondents were ﬁxating on a single attribute rather than
attending to all attributes (known as lexicographic prefer-
ences), the information provided in the qualitative debrieﬁngs
shows their decision-making processes were consistent with
the continuity axiom. They did attend to the cash attribute
and weighed up the values of teviala against the cash pay-
ments. Likewise, I10 and I11 (assigned to the ‘‘improved farm-
ing” segment) reported that they compared the cash payments
with the utility they would get from legal forest tenure. Trade-
oﬀ is most explicit among segment 3, as I18 stated:
``So let's see, if I receive a payment of nine million Ariary over 10 years,
which amounts to nine hundred thousand Ariary per year, and even if I still
continue farming here, that won't be proﬁtable. But then if it goes up a little
bit, to let's say 12 or 15 million, then it may be more attractive. If I get for
instance 12 million just as a lump sum payment, that would be really ideal,
that would deﬁnitely be my preferred choice. . .. If I get 15 million, I will
build a house in town, then I will rent it out, I can still continue living here,
so that I can get a monthly revenue on top of my crop revenues. If I receive
the payments over let's say 20 years instead of a lump sum, I will then in-
vest part of it in some lucrative activities like poultry, and then keep some in
the bank, so by the end of 20 years, I will have saved large sums of
money.”
[I18 (recent migrant, 39, MTD)]
Similarly, respondents’ accounts suggest that instead of
exhibiting lexicographic preferences, they rather expect lower
utility from other attributes. Holdouts (segment 1) claimed
for instance to have considered the cash donations but simply
do not value cash given its limited value in the context in
which they live. As I3 attested:
``If we were sure that the cash would really cover all our needs and if we
were conﬁdent that investing it would generate returns and be proﬁtable, we
might have liked it, but the reality is quite different.”
[I3 (indigene, 47, MTD)]
A few interviewees, however, admitted overtly to having not
attended to some attributes. For instance, I6 and I7 (holdouts)
clearly expressed that they ignored the cash payments not
because the utility levels of the cash are low or zero (as their
choices might imply) but because they do not believe that
the cash payment would really happen in reality. Their
accounts suggest feelings of disappointment toward external
agencies promoting alternative livelihoods or implementing
compensation measures, for instance they claim to have not
perceived any beneﬁt from the park’s establishment but
instead have experienced destitution. They (I5, I6, I7) also
anchored their choices on the incommensurable cultural value
of teviala by stating ‘‘nothing will ever compensate us for
teviala, it is our identity”.
Similarly, some segment 4 households (‘‘cash”) did not con-
sider the teviala attribute at all in their choice decisions. For
instance, I23 is only concerned about how he can best invest
the cash to generate returns. I22 and I24 pointed to the very
small likelihood of an open forest frontier; ‘‘Forests are
already well protected, the government is very determined to
protect it”. However, they also genuinely favor forest protec-
tion and would like their future descendants to enjoy the for-
ests’ multiple beneﬁts; ‘‘I want my children to have real-life
experience of lemurs’ songs, I do not want them to become
an ancient history that they would only hear on the radio once
all the forests are gone.”
We however ﬁnd that experience of forest conservation or
compensatory interventions are not systematically associated
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thought processes suggest that apparent non-conformity to the
continuity axiom does not imply invalidity of respondents’
choices, i.e., they represent their genuine preferences. For
instance, if most holdouts and improved farming households
do not attend to cash, it is because they genuinely attach a
low importance to that attribute.
With regard to the content validity of our DCE survey, i.e.,
the extent to which respondents found the payment vehicle
plausible or believed in the consequentiality of their choices,
the qualitative debrieﬁngs suggest that most of the intervie-
wees’ choices (n = 19 out of 25, 76%) conform to the assump-
tions of the method. Although a few interviewees (I5, I6, I7)
explicitly raised issues with regard to the plausibility of the cash
payment scenario (e.g., ‘‘Getting that much money or any aid
at all from faraway donors is utopia”) or the survey scenario
(I22 and I24), the majority of respondents did perceive their
choices as consequential and were actively engaged with the
DCE survey. Most respondents were also pleased to be con-
sulted about their preferences and aspirations. As I25 asserted:
``The choices were so appealing, we thoroughly enjoyed participating in the
exercise, it is the ﬁrst time that a researcher asked us about what we really
need and want.
[I25 (indigene, 64, MTD)]4. DISCUSSION
(a) The eﬀect of experience of forest use restrictions and
compensatory interventions on welfare impacts of forest con-
servation
Our results suggest that household prior experience with
forest use restrictions has a strong inﬂuence on both their
appraisal of the welfare impacts of future restrictions and
expectations of compensatory mechanisms. Our results there-
fore suggest caution is needed in using DCE as a means of esti-
mating compensations for long term and complex projects
such as forest conservation. Although two segments (trade-
oﬀ and cash—36% of the total sample) are composed of both
experienced and inexperienced households, their rationales
substantially diﬀer and are anchored in their experience of for-
est use restrictions. Our results are consistent with previous
studies which show that experience with a good or policy
markedly inﬂuences both WTP estimates and the predictabil-
ity of respondents’ preferences (e.g., Adamowicz, 1994;
Ferrini & Scarpa, 2007; Hanley, Kristrom, & Shogren, 2009).
Our ﬁndings could be considered evidence of experiential
learning (Kolb, 1984). Experienced households gave many
accounts of why they value their rights to continue teviala
practices owing to a solid knowledge of the no teviala policy
in question and their negative experiences of development
interventions. Their lack of interest toward the improved rice
farming is consistent with the high failure rate of such inter-
ventions. A number of studies (e.g., McConnell, 2002;
Pollini, 2009; Scott, 1998) have described how agricultural
development interventions are often not taken up due to
requiring unrealistic labor inputs and because farmers cannot
aﬀord to invest in something unproven. While one can con-
clude that they may be biased against novel alternatives, we
argue that their preferences are the outcomes of learning and
knowledge gained through adaptive processes (Denrell &
March, 2001).
The high value attached to teviala by experienced house-
holds is consistent with anthropologists’ ﬁndings in Madagas-car that deforestation is often driven by a desire to attain
customary tenure, since agricultural land is usually private,
while forest land often is not (Keller, 2008). The high cultural
value of teviala to Betsimisarika farmers is also important
(Desbureaux & Brimont, 2015; Hume, 2006). The reason
why many respondents treat cash as dubious and unreliable
is supported by Sandel (2000). That is, their indiﬀerence
toward the cash is anchored in the very reasons why it is use-
ful, i.e., it is anonymous, easily transported, and easily spent.
They viewed agricultural lands accessed by forest clearance as
a long-term land acquisition strategy which is not as easily
substitutable or interchangeable with other goods or assets
as cash with its ﬂeeting nature. The strong bequest value of
teviala practices, i.e., the value they placed on ensuring higher
utility for the future generation from forest clearing may
explain the highly positive utility of the 20-years’ time horizon
(Table 3). Forest clearing is viewed over a long-term planning
horizon, not to address the immediate households’ needs but
those of future descendants. Such ﬁndings challenge the per-
vading myth that indigenous communities have a high dis-
count rate or high time preference rate (e.g., Holden,
Shiferaw, & Wik, 1998; Poulos & Whittington, 2000).
In contrast, households with limited experience of forest
conservation exhibit substantially less aversion to losing their
rights to continue teviala than more experienced respondents.
This is in stark contrast to the ‘‘endowment eﬀect” theory
(Thaler, 1980) which predicts that an individual values a good
more highly if his/her rights toward the good have been estab-
lished (de facto or de jure). Psychological feelings that can be
interpreted as regret (Loomes & Sugden, 1982) may explain
this result, i.e., more experienced households regret losing
the previous open forest frontier that they used to beneﬁt from
and anticipate regret in relation to the continuation of tight-
ened forest protection.
Respondents who are inexperienced in terms of exposure to
conservation restrictions (‘‘improved farming” segment), have
also been aﬀected by their experience of open access, and their
strong preferences for the legal forest tenure may originate
from their inability to exclude others (Ostrom, 1999). In
APT there has been very rapid recent immigration of people
from a variety of ethnicities (Merina, Betsimisaraka and Beza-
nozano) attracted by land availability. These inexperienced
households’ strong preference for the improved rice farming
is consistent with the positive correlation between individual
land tenure and adoption of more eﬃcient land management
practices reported by previous scholars (e.g., Barrows &
Roth, 1990). This is also supported by some respondents,
who although indigenous, appear more inclined to adopt
new techniques only after they have freely beneﬁted from an
open access situation and realized that forests are becoming
increasingly scarce. Thus it is not just experience of the inter-
ventions that matters, but experience of relevant counter-
factuals. Ex ante estimates of compensation based on DCE
might therefore beneﬁt from deliberately including respon-
dents with a variety of experiences.
(b) Theoretical and content validity of DCE results
Although we found violations of the continuity axiom
among six debriefed respondents, most gave accounts of
decision-making processes which conform to the axiom. Our
qualitative ﬁndings suggest that most apparent patterns of
attribute non-attendance are in fact theoretically valid, i.e.,
genuinely represent respondents’ anticipated welfare impacts.
Excluding these responses would bias the DCE outcomes
and resulting policy implications (Lancsar & Louviere, 2006).
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ence techniques (Clark, Burgess, & Harrison, 2000; Powe
et al., 2005) or verbal protocol analyses (Schkade & Payne,
1994) (all in developed country settings) found that many
respondents’ willingness-to-pay ﬁgures are not consistent with
rational choice theory and instead represent resistance to the
commodiﬁcation of nature. While it is clear that these values
do not reﬂect the worth of the good being valued, Clark
et al. (2000) argue that they are rational preferences and
should still be considered ‘‘economic”, as the deﬁnition and
importance placed on rationality depends on the approach
to consumer theory to which one ascribes.
We concur with Hess et al. (2013) and Balcombe, Fraser,
and McSorley (2015)’s conclusions which call for the reap-
praisal of previous DCE studies showing or inferring signiﬁ-
cant shares of attribute non-attendance and using alternative
modeling approaches to accommodate this issue. In our study
context, although the insigniﬁcance of the cash among the
‘‘holdouts” and ‘‘improved farming” segments poses signiﬁ-
cant complications for the computation of monetary
willingness-to-accept estimates, they accurately represent
how respondents believe that forest protection will aﬀect local
livelihoods. Our ﬁndings, together with previous literature
(e.g., Hensher, 2010b), suggest that DCE researchers may need
to re-engage with the psychology of decision making and look
more into processes, i.e., how respondents construct their
choices and what constitute actual violations of the assump-
tions of rational choice theory. As Gregory and Slovic
(1997, p. 3) put it, ‘‘truth may ultimately reside in the process
of the evaluation, rather than the outcome” and DCE research-
ers can gain deeper understanding of respondents’ thought
processes using qualitative methods.
The satisfactorily high content validity of our results can be
mostly attributed to the considerable eﬀorts we put into pilot-
ing the valuation survey and explaining it to respondents. We
used large photographs and dolls to represent the donor and
gendarmes and colorful background papers to represent the
three alternatives in each choice set. We also used lengthy
warm-up steps before giving the actual choice sets to give
respondents some practice. The warm-ups also helped estab-
lish trust with the enumerators, desensitize forest clearance
and ensure that respondents understood the task of making
trade-oﬀs. This approach was successful for ensuring the
respondents understood the aim of the task and that it was
hypothetical (important for ethical reasons; see Appendices
A and B). In our case the interview necessarily lasted on aver-
age an hour and a half, this, and the time needed to reach
households, should be borne in mind by researchers hoping
to achieve large sample sizes.
(c) Study design
It is important to note that our research design means it is
not possible to isolate completely the eﬀect of experience on
the welfare impacts of forest conservation. The inferences we
can draw from the results must therefore be read in terms of
this important caveat. Randomizing an intervention (such as
exposure to forest use restrictions and compensatory projects)
or collecting longitudinal data with unambiguous baseline
measures from recently established protected areas would
enable isolation of potential confounding variables, such as
households’ immigration status, but would be impractical
and would raise ethical concerns as they may involve long-
lasting negative eﬀects.
There is always a compromise between the external validity
of a natural experiment, and the ability to isolate the eﬀects ofa speciﬁc variable (in this case experience of conservation on
respondents’ preferences). In real world settings, it is often
not possible to eliminate all rival explanations (e.g., in our
case, immigration may not be exogenous to conservation
restrictions). Our quasi-experimental approach comparing
communities diﬀering in their experience of forest use restric-
tions matched on important socio-economic parameters is
the only practical option in these circumstances. The use of
a real-life setting, with all the relevant context, has value in
its own right and increases the applicability of our results to
other development interventions, despite not allowing perfect
and unambiguous attribution. In addition, the qualitative
debrieﬁngs provide evidence that corroborates the eﬀect of
conservation experience. The holdout households’ experience
of conservation restrictions and compensatory interventions
have motivated the very low value that they placed on
improved agricultural techniques as well as the long-term
importance of lands accessed by forest clearance that far out-
weighed the proposed cash compensations. On the other hand,
the ‘‘improved farming” households who have experienced
weaker and less consistent enforcement dreaded a tragedy of
the commons situation and were averse to an open forest fron-
tier scenario or weak protection.
Despite the limitations of our experimental design, our
study oﬀers some important practical recommendations for
designing DCE surveys in remote and impoverished areas of
developing countries where literacy rates are very low and
the good being valued is sensitive (see Appendix A). Finding
the right balance between managing expectations and ensuring
workable and realistic scenarios requires careful adjustments
as well as extensive piloting, ideally interspersed across
sequential stages. A balance must also be struck between
emphasizing the neutrality of the research and ensuring the
credibility of the scenarios, particularly that of the institu-
tional regime which would deliver the hypothetical good.
Crafting the right language for the valuation scenarios war-
rants careful consideration and often encompasses nuance that
is lost in translation. If the research is led by foreign research-
ers, involving local researchers who understand the cultural
norms and the language in the design and piloting, at the early
stages of the survey design is therefore critically important.
(d) Policy implications
There have been a number of commitments stating that
local people living at the forest frontier, many of whom are
extremely poor and marginalized, should not be negatively
aﬀected by eﬀorts to conserve forests for the global beneﬁts
they provide (Martin, McGuire, & Sullivan, 2013). Estimating
how much or what type of compensation is appropriate is
challenging as those with experience of forest use restrictions
provided very diﬀerent appraisals of the local welfare impacts
of future conservation restrictions than those who lack such
experience. Thus, although we ﬁnd encouraging evidence that
DCEs can be successfully used in a rural developing country
context with low literacy to elicit current preferences (high the-
oretical and content validity of the DCE survey), ex ante val-
uations of welfare impacts of conservation may not accurately
estimate compensations necessary for forest use restrictions.
When respondents are more experienced with forest protec-
tion, neither cash nor support for an improved rice project is
perceived to compensate them for teviala restrictions.
The high level of confounding between households’ immi-
gration status and their experience of conservation restrictions
however implies that ‘‘experience” is not a simple parameter.
While the ‘‘holdouts” segment households have more experi-
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have also experience of weak protection and the resulting
immigration. The two segments have therefore diﬀerently
informed preferences and any single population of respon-
dents may never have experience of both scenarios. Research-
ers should therefore aim to elicit preferences from individuals
with diﬀerent perspectives (not just the population that will be
aﬀected, but also populations that have been aﬀected) when
doing ex ante evaluation, and use these diﬀerent preferences
to model the local welfare impacts of a given intervention.
Nevertheless, considerable diﬃculty will remain when using
DCE to accurately estimate, in advance, the appropriate com-
pensation for a conservation intervention that may aﬀect peo-
ple negatively. This calls into question the viability of the
model of equitable coercive conservation. 10 We argue that
there is a need to rethink conservation approaches, particu-
larly the urgency which with interventions are implemented
and the feasibility of achieving fair compensation for coercive
measures.
The strong bequest motive for maintaining the rights to
clear land among experienced and inexperienced respondents
alike suggests that secure forest tenure may slow down defor-
estation. Many households valued secure tenure because it
would allow them to retain the option of accessing new agri-
cultural land in the future, without having to clear it now,
to avoid losing it either to the state or immigrants. This is a
well-known result in ﬁsheries economics, where harvesting is
higher in open access ﬁsheries and slows down when ﬁshers
are granted individual property rights (Holzer, 2015). Many
have argued similarly that promoting legal titles to land in
forested areas with weak property rights can be similarly eﬀec-
tive (e.g., Chhatre, Lakhanpal, Larson, Nelson, Ojha, & Rao,
2012). While giving secure common tenure over forests to
stable communities (i.e., with a tradition of communal and
shared ownership) might slow deforestation without any ban
on teviala, individual legal tenure may be prioritized when
the situation is not an idealized village with clearly deﬁnedcommon rights. Either way, conservation could then be nego-
tiated through PES schemes where local people’s participation
is genuinely voluntary. This could take the form of renewable
easements, to allow local residents to learn over multiple
transactions. This recommendation is driven not only by a
concern for social justice and equity (Hellum & Derman,
2004), but also by a pragmatic assessment that local forest
dwellers have the greatest impact on resources and also the
most to lose from non-sustainable uses of these resources.
When ex ante estimates of compensation are very diﬃcult to
achieve, voluntary PES schemes may actually have lower
transaction costs relative to trying to achieve fair compensa-
tions if markets are competitive and property rights enforce-
able (Pagiola, Arcenas, & Platais, 2005). However,
formalizing individual ownership may be open to elite capture
and embed inequalities. We argue, however, that any mecha-
nisms aiming at achieving equitable compensations would
likely face the same constraints.
Where conservation is imposed on local people, and forest
tenure remains with the government, great care needs to be
taken in developing approaches to adequately compensate
for welfare impacts of conservation restrictions. We argue
that the welfare impacts of forest use restrictions must be
continually monitored. Otherwise local livelihoods may be
seriously harmed. Compensation using cash, while a pre-
ferred option for some households, has signiﬁcant limitations
because of the limited opportunities for investment in remote
rural areas, and lump sum payments are most problematic.
Those most likely to be aﬀected negatively by conservation
restrictions may be least able to invest cash to generate
returns. However, the reluctance of some groups to engage
in improved agricultural techniques, and the very low values
they place on such interventions, should also suggest caution
when providing development projects as compensation
schemes. Such schemes need to promote development inter-
ventions which will both be eﬀective in the region but also
accepted locally.NOTES1. Ex ante assessment methods predict the impact of a program or policy
prior to their implementation (Todd & Wolpin, 2008).
2. Choice experiments and contingent valuation methods are stated
preference techniques which are a set of valuation methods which allow
analysts to generate welfare estimates of environmental beneﬁts/damages
based on respondents’ stated willingness-to-pay or willingness-to-accept
estimates. (See Freeman (2003) for an introduction to SP techniques in
environmental valuation.)
3. In this study, we deﬁne validity as a property of a method given a
particular intended application of that method. Thus a certain DCE may
be valid if the objective is to reveal people’s current preferences, but the
same DCE may be invalid if the intention is to use it to decide how much
respondents must be paid in compensation (or what type of compensa-
tions) so that they are left no worse oﬀ.
4. In economics, these compensations are termed ‘‘compensating varia-
tion” which is the amount of money needed to render a person indiﬀerent
to a policy change that would make them worse-oﬀ (e.g., price increase or
quantity decrease), i.e., it measures the amount of money required to
maintain a person’s economic welfare, at the level it was at before the
change (Freeman, 2003).
5. The smallest administrative unit in Madagascar.6. of which 102 households were randomly allocated to the choice
experiment survey used in this study.
7. For comparative purposes, we also estimated a conditional logit
model and a mixed logit model where the cash attribute is interacted with
the household-level experience variable (see Appendix G).
8. We did not include these agricultural practices (see Appendix E) in the
LCM as they are mechanisms that are in the causal pathway (conservation
restrictions aﬀected how local people accessed lands and practiced
agriculture). The inclusion of the household-level experience variable
should have already accounted for their potential eﬀects on respondents’
preferences.
9. The experiences of the improved rice farming variable is insigniﬁcant
in all four segments, i.e., the four segments identiﬁed by the LCM are not
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent with regard to their experiences of the improved rice
farming.
10. The term ‘‘coercive conservation” refers to conservation measures
that are imposed by the state on local communities, and are backed by
state enforcement. Such repressive models of conservation often lack local
legitimacy, local participation is not voluntary, and compliance is
obtained by coercion either by the use of military forces or other law
enforcement agencies. The term was used in Peluso’s (1993) inﬂuential
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